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Conceiving and Executing 
Operation Gauntlet
The Canadian-Led Raid on Spitzbergen, 1941 
R YA N  D E A N  &  P.  W H I T N E Y  L A C K E N B A U E R
Abstract : In August and September 1941, Canadian Brigadier Arthur 
Potts led a successful but little known combined operation by a small 
task force of Canadian, British, and Norwegian troops in the Spitzbergen 
(Svalbard) archipelago in the Arctic Ocean. After extensive planning and 
political conversations between Allied civil and military authorities, the 
operation was re-scaled so that a small, mixed task force would destroy 
mining and communications infrastructure on this remote cluster of 
islands, repatriate Russian miners and their families to Russia, and 
evacuate Norwegian residents to Britain. While a modest non-combat 
mission, Operation Gauntlet represented Canada’s first expeditionary 
operation in the Arctic, yielding general lessons about the value of 
specialized training and representation from appropriate functional 
trades, unity of command, operational secrecy, and deception, ultimately 
providing a boost to Canadian morale. Interactions also demonstrated 
the complexities of coalition warfare as well as the challenges associated 
with civil-military interaction in the theatre of operations.
Brigadier [A.E.] Potts and his officers and men had ... been the 
chief actors in an episode unique in military history, and one which 
illustrated in singularly striking fashion the extent of a conflict which 
far better than that of 1914-18, deserves the title of World War. No 
previous struggle between modern states had brought the Arctic seas so 
definitely with its scope; and never before had a military force advanced 
so close to the North Pole. Before this unpredictable war has run its 
course, Canadian soldiers may serve in other strange corners of the 
world; but it may be doubted whether any detachment will find itself 
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2 Conceiving and Executing Operation Gauntlet
operating in a more remote area than that which fell to the lot of the 
expedition to Spitsbergen.
– C.P. Stacey (1942)1
In August And september 1941, Brigadier Arthur Potts, the officer commanding 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, led a 
successful combined operation by a small task force of Canadian, 
British, and Norwegian troops in the Spitzbergen archipelago. This 
remote cluster of islands, situated on the Arctic Ocean route to 
Russia’s northern ports, had assumed heightened strategic importance 
after the German invasion of Russia two months earlier. Part of a 
series of initiatives undertaken by the British at the insistence of 
the Soviets to establish and secure an Arctic convoy route between 
the newfound allies, Operation Gauntlet wrecked the valuable coal 
mines of Spitzbergen and their supporting infrastructure, destroyed 
the archipelago’s wireless and meteorological stations, repatriated 
the Russian mining population working there to Archangel, and 
evacuated all the Norwegians on Spitzbergen to Britain.
Gauntlet is notable for being Canada’s first expeditionary 
operation in the Arctic and for being one of only two operations in 
1941 that took Canadian troops beyond the confines of the United 
Kingdom.2 Like the better-known Canadian contribution to the us-led, 
unopposed invasion of the Aleutian island of Kiska in August 1943,3 
the operation at Spitzbergen did not involve combat against an enemy 
force. Consequently, it is generally overlooked in the historiography 
of the Canadian Army during the Second World War. Official army 
historian C.P. Stacey wrote a short wartime article on Gauntlet in 
Canadian Geographical Journal4 highlighting some of the soldiers’ 
experiences for the public and dedicated a few pages in Six Years 
1  C.P. Stacey, “The Canadians at Spitsbergen,” Canadian Geographical Journal 24-
5:5 (1942): 71.
2  The other operation involved the deployment of Canadian sappers to the fortresses 
of Gibraltar. See C.P. Stacey, Six Years of War (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1955), 299.
3  On Canadian contributions to Operation Cottage, see Stacey, Six Years of War, 
492-505; Brian Garfield, The Thousand Mile War (Fairbanks: University of Alaska 
Press, 1995) and Galen Perras, Stepping Stones to Nowhere: The Aleutian Islands, 
Alaska, and American Military Strategy, 1867-1945 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003). 
As a result of a friendly-fire incident, Japanese booby-traps, and ammunition 
incidents, four Canadians and 28 Americans were killed during the Kiska operation. 
4  See Stacey, “Canadians at Spitsbergen,” 49-73. 
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of War to outlining the operation from a Canadian perspective.5 
American officer Donald Bittner elaborated on the operational 
experiences covered in Stacey’s original article some twenty-five 
years later, nesting Gauntlet within the larger context of the Allied 
occupation of Iceland,6 while a recent article by French historian 
Éric Coutu situates the raid in the early wartime development of 
Britain’s Combined Operations Headquarters.7 Beyond these sources 
and a handful of memoirs,8 few commentators seem to consider this 
relatively minor Arctic operation worthy of serious consideration.
This article situates and analyzes Gauntlet in its larger strategic 
context, explaining how and why the operation evolved into the form 
that it did—and the Canadian role in it. The scope of the operation 
reflected the complexities of coalition warfare, demonstrated by the 
interplay between Soviet political pressure for aggressive Allied action 
in the Arctic and the limited British military capability to meet these 
demands. Ultimately representing a compromise between the political 
objective of heartening the Russians and the military objective of 
securing the new Arctic convoy route, Operation Gauntlet satisfied 
neither strategic objective in attempting to accomplish both.
At the tactical level, however, Brigadier Potts’ force carried 
out its limited mission with complete success. The enemy did not 
interfere with the operation, and not a single soldier or sailor was lost. 
Furthermore, Gauntlet gave a few hundred Canadians an adventure 
and a taste of active employment after weary months of waiting in 
Britain. While the operation provided a boost to Canadian morale, 
interactions between the Canadians and some local civilian authorities 
5  See C.P. Stacey, Six Years of War, 301-07, which includes a full-page map of 
Spitzbergen.
6  Donald F. Bittner, “Descent in the North - The 1941 Canadian raid on Spitsbergen,” 
Canadian Defence Quarterly 11:4 (1982): 28-34. In broader context, see Bittner, 
“The British Occupation of Iceland, 1940-1942” (University of Missouri – Colombia, 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1974).
7  Éric Coutu, “Le quartier général des opérations combinées et l’expédition canado-
britannique au Spitzberg (août 1941),” Guerre mondiale et des conflits contemporains 
220/5 (2004): 45-69. See also Coutu, «Les missions effectuées par le Quartier général 
des opérations combinées de 1940 à 1942» (Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle - 
Paris 3, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 2005).
8  See, for example, Ross Munro, Gauntlet to Overlord: The Story of the Canadian 
Army (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1946); Sir Philip Vian, 
Action This Day: A War Memoir (London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1960); and 
Alexander Glen, Footholds Against a Whirlwind (London: Hutchinson of London, 
1975).
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revealed the challenges associated with civil-military interaction in 
the theatre of operations, the need for creative and practical problem 
solving, and the requirement to correct misinformation at the 
diplomatic level. Despite these challenges, Operation Gauntlet, in the 
words of C.P. Stacey, “accomplished everything which it set out to 
do”9 at the tactical level.
setting the stage: strategic context and operational 
planning
The notion of sending an Allied military force to Spitzbergen10 in 
August of 1941 was originally a Soviet one. Stalin met Churchill’s 
offer of support to the Soviet Union in the wake of the 22 June 1941 
German invasion with steep demands: the establishment of a second 
front on the European continent to relieve German pressure on the 
Red Army and the immediate shipment of Western war materials to 
make good Soviet shortages.11 Despite Britain’s strained capabilities 
at the time, Churchill strove to meet these demands to keep the 
Soviet Union in the war. On 7 July Churchill instructed the British 
ambassador in Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps, to open negotiations for 
a mutual aid treaty.12
From the beginning of these negotiations the Soviets attempted 
to draw the British into the Arctic. Admiral Nikolay Kuznetsov, the 
Soviet Commissar of the Navy, requested that the British send a 
naval force to the White Sea to disrupt Germany’s sea-borne supply 
route around Norway and undermine General Eduard Dietl’s offensive 
against Murmansk.13 Churchill responded positively, commanding 
First Sea Lord Admiral Dudley Pound on 12 July to send a squadron 
of ships to Archangel, and Pound in turn dispatched a naval 
delegation to Murmansk to investigate further naval cooperation 
9  Stacey, “The Canadians at Spitsbergen,” 71.
10  Now commonly known by its Norwegian name of Svalbard. This paper will use the 
geographic names commonly used at the time. 
11  David Wragg, Sacrifice for Stalin: The Cost and Value of the Arctic Convoys Re-
Assessed (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword, 2005), 49. 
12  Christopher Mann, British Policy and Strategy towards Norway, 1941-45 (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 15.
13  Philip Vian, Action This Day: A War Memoir (London: Frederick Muller, 1960), 
65–66.
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measures such as the basing of British ships in Soviet Arctic ports.14 
Stalin had made it clear that he favoured the Murmansk route for 
convoying war materials because he was concerned that the Japanese 
might cut-off Vladivostok on the Pacific and that the land route 
through Iran lacked the infrastructure to be a viable option.15 The 
Murmansk convoy route was the shortest and most direct, but also 
the most dangerous as Allied ships would have to run a 2,000-mile 
long gauntlet around Norway, contending with the threat of German 
air and sea attack along with the freezing and tempestuous Barents 
Sea.16
The Admiralty, however, did not share the Soviet enthusiasm for 
joint action in the Arctic. Admiral Sir John Tovey, Commander-in-
Chief of the Home Fleet, whose stretched command would assume 
the burden of these proposed operations, was certainly cool to the 
idea. It was vexing from the British perspective, as naval historian 
Richard Woodman writes, that Stalin “comprehended little of the 
war at sea, an ignorant and infuriating disinterest he was to exhibit 
during the whole of the maritime Arctic campaign that he now 
expected Churchill to open.”17 In weighing the mismatch between 
British military capabilities and Soviet ambitions, Tovey concluded 
“that no political object would be served by attempting military 
impossibilities.”18 This stance earned Tovey the ire of Churchill who 
was coming under increasing political pressure to take concrete action 
in supporting the Soviet Union.19 
14  Mann, British Policy and Strategy towards Norway, 15. A force under Rear-
Admiral W.F. Wake-Walker sailed from Scapa on 23 July comprised of the aircraft 
carriers Furious and Victorious and cruisers Devonshire and Suffolk escorted by six 
destroyers. The results of their operations against Dietl’s sea-borne supply line were 
small. B. B. Schofield, The Russian Convoys (London: B. T. Batsford, 1964), 23-24.
15  Robert Carse, A Cold Corner of Hell (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., 1969), 12.
16  James Levy, “The Needs of Political Policy versus the Reality of Military 
Operations: Royal Navy Opposition to the Arctic Convoys, 1942,” The Journal of 
Strategic Studies 26:1 (2003): 38 and Schofield, The Russian Convoys, 24.
17  Richard Woodman, The Arctic Convoys (London: John Murray Ltd, 1994), 8.
18  Quoted in Vian, Action This Day, 73.
19  Mann, British Policy and Strategy towards Norway, 15. 
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On 15 July, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav 
Molotov floated a scheme of his own during a meeting with Cripps.20 
He suggested that Anglo-Soviet cooperation be extended to cover 
an occupation of Spitzbergen and Bear Island which flanked the sea 
lane from Britain to the Soviet Union. “This would enable a secure 
sea lane to be made from Archangel to the West and would also give 
facilities for air service between the countries,” Cripps noted in his 
report of the meeting. There were 1,500 Soviet miners on Spitzbergen 
who could be armed to garrison the archipelago for Allied use. With 
the sea lane secured, Cripps recounted that Molotov outlined a plan 
that would use Soviet troops supported by the British to drive the 
Germans from northern Norway. “The idea seems to me a good one,” 
Cripps reported to his Foreign Office, “especially as reads the Islands 
and it should present no difficulty and would protect Soviet miners 
in Spitzbergen from possible German raids.”21 The British quickly 
rejected any large-scale military operations in northern Norway, 
however, given that this would divert naval and air assets from more 
pressing commitments elsewhere.22
Aware of the mounting political pressure for action, the British 
Chiefs of Staff (cos) saw the benefits in occupying Spitzbergen 
and Bear Island. By 17 July, the British Joint Planning Staff (jps) 
reported to the War Cabinet that “the alliance between Great 
Britain and Russia has given Spitzbergen a strategical value which it 
did not previously possess.”23 Given its position astride the sea lines 
of communication between Britain and northern Russia, control of 
the archipelago mattered. If the Allies cut off the supply of high-
quality coal to Norway, this would have economic implications for 
the German war effort. Furthermore, Spitzbergen could be used as 
a refuelling base for Allied shipping to Murmansk and to support 
Allied aviation in the area. Noting the constraints on British forces, 
the jps “consider[ed] that Spitzbergen should be occupied provided 
20  Despite General Filipp Golikov and Admiral Kuznetov being present at the 
meeting between Molotov and Cripps, the British Military Mission in Moscow 
understood the idea to have been Molotov’s. No.30 Military Mission Moscow to War 
Office, 15 July 1941, The National Archives (TNA), file CAB 121/442. 
21  From Moscow to Foreign Office, 15 July 1941, TNA, file FO 371/29487.
22  From Chiefs of Staff to No. 30 Military Mission in Moscow, 19 July 1941, TNA, 
file WO 106/1998.
23  Joint Planning Staff to the War Cabinet, “Operations in the North,” 17 July 1941, 
TNA, file CAB 121/442.
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the Russians are prepared to provide the necessary army garrison.”24 
The cos approved the operation contingent on the Norwegian 
government-in-exile giving their consent.25
Negotiations between the British, the Norwegians, and the 
Soviets soon yielded consent to mount a joint operation along one 
of two lines: evacuating the miners from Spitzbergen or occupying 
the archipelago. British planners initially focused on the latter 
option, which would deny the “important areas” to Germany and 
allow the Allies to defend an anchorage for shipping. According to 
their plan, a force would garrison Spitzbergen until it froze over in 
October. Intelligence appraisals assumed that the landing would be 
unopposed—an important assumption given that all British assault 
craft were allotted to the pending Operation Pilgrim (the proposed 
British seizure of Portugal’s Canary Islands), thereby making it 
“impossible to equip an expedition to Spitzbergen which will be capable 
of overcoming anything more than the very slightest opposition.”26 
On 24 July, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John Dill, 
met with the commander of the Canadian Corps, Lieutenant-General 
A.G.L. McNaughton, to informally offer the developing operation to 
him and his troops. McNaughton readily agreed, and the next day 
the War Office officially approached the Canadian Army to provide 
the troops to defend the proposed naval anchorage and refuelling 
base at Spitzbergen.27 
McNaughton’s enthusiasm for Canadian action was unsurprising. 
His soldiers, eager for active service since their arrival in Britain 
in December 1939, had “found themselves committed instead to a 
defensive and largely static role” for the next two years.28 However 
vital this anti-invasion role may have seemed, it was no replacement 
for actual battle indoctrination. Canadian units had been tapped 
for proposed British operations in Norway, the Low Countries, and 
France earlier in the war, but these plans had all been cancelled, 
24  Ibid.
25  Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 17 July 1941, TNA, file CAB 121/442. 
26  Joint Planning Staff, “Spitzbergen,” 23 July 1941, TNA, file CAB 84/33.
27  Instructions for the Preparation of Force 111, 25 July 1941, Library and Archives 
Canada (LAC), file RG24 C-2 Vol 12298. 
28  Stacey, The Canadians in Britain, 11–12.
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leaving the Canadian field force “bitterly disappointed.”29 Although 
the subsequent German invasion of the Soviet Union made an attack 
against England increasingly unlikely, two restrictions kept the 
Canadians confined to England. First, McNaughton had insisted that 
the Canadian Corps remain together so that British commanders 
did not siphon off units piecemeal. This earned him a wrongful 
reputation for wanting to keep the Canadians out of fighting when, 
in the assessment of historian John Rickard, he had demonstrated 
“a sincere willingness to consider any and all requests from the 
War Office for Canadian forces to join the fighting” in Europe.30 
Second, Canadian Minister of National Defence J.L. Ralston, having 
crossed swords with McNaughton about the general’s unilateral 
decision to commit Canadian troops to Norway the previous year, 
ruled that Canadian troops could not be moved out of England 
without government consent. Thus, McNaughton was limited to 
pursuing raiding opportunities so that his men could acquire combat 
experience. At the end of June 1941 he had sent a representative to 
the War Office to explore opportunities along these lines.31 Now, a 
month later, the War Office was offering one.
With McNaughton on board, senior Canadian officers met with 
representatives from several British War Office branches on 26 July 
to devise a plan for Operation Flaxman. “The proposal made at this 
time was for a considerably more ambitious enterprise than the one 
finally carried out,” Stacey observed. The basic intent was to deploy 
effectively an infantry brigade, less one battalion, to Spitzbergen to 
occupy the islands until the end of October. According to this plan, 
“Force 111” would primarily comprise an infantry battalion from the 
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (ppclI) and an infantry 
29  Ibid, 22-26. On earlier aborted plans for Canadians to engage in combat and the 
resulting frustration of Canadian soldiers, see The Canadians in Britain 1939-1944 
(Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1944), 22-26; and David J. Bercuson, Maple Leaf Against 
the Axis (Toronto: Stoddart, 1995), 62-65.
30  John N. Rickard, The Politics of Command: Lieutenant-General A.G.L. 
McNaughton and the Canadian Army (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 
40-41, 52-53. 
31  Bercuson, Maple Leaf Against the Axis, 65; John Swettenham, McNaughton 1887-
1943, Vol. 2 (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1969), 181; and Rickard, Politics of 
Command, 41-43.
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battalion from the Edmonton Regiment.32 The British would provide 
ancillary units and additional supplies.33 Information on German 
activities on Spitzbergen was scanty, but planners continued to expect 
an unopposed landing. 
The Canadian Military Headquarters (cmhq) eagerly threw 
itself into planning Flaxman, but the War Office continued to shape 
the character of the operation—and to raise doubts about whether 
it should proceed. Senior British officers voiced concerns about a 
possible German air threat to the operation, but McNaughton did 
not see this as a serious risk. “Any air attack would be limited,” 
a contemporary report noted, “and he was of the opinion that the 
expedition should not be cancelled on account of the danger of air 
attack.” The Canadians could adopt passive defence (troop dispersion 
and slit trenches) to withstand a German attack, and the force did 
have one light anti-aircraft battery. Brigadier Arthur Potts, the 
commander designate of Force 111, concurred.34 Besides, McNaughton 
argued, the threat of air attack was worthwhile if it meant drawing 
off German bombers from somewhere more important like the Soviet 
front.35 Having heard McNaughton’s appraisal of the risks, the War 
Office decided to proceed with preparations for Flaxman, but delayed 
launching the operation until more intelligence could be collected 
on the archipelago.36 Based on the assumption that the project had 
been approved by the British War Committee, the Canadian War 
Committee told McNaughton on 31 July that it was: 
[…] quite prepared to have you act on your own judgement as to whether 
to cooperate and to what extent. In arriving at a decision you will no 
32  C.P. Stacey noted the similarity between this order of battle and the Canadian 
force provided for service in Norway in April 1940. Canadian Military Headquarters 
(CMHQ) Historical Report No.56, “The Spitzbergen Operation, August-September 
1941” (20 December 1941), 2-3. These two regiments had been thwarted from 
seeing action in Norway the previous year when that operation was cancelled. 
G.R. Stevens, A City Goes to War: History of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment (3 
PPCLI) (Edmonton: Edmonton Regiment Association, 1964), 211. On the secrecy 
surrounding the operation, see War Diary No. 5 Fd. Amb. R.C.A.M.C, Force 111, 27 
July 1941, LAC, file RG24 C-3 Vol. 17489.
33  Minutes of meeting attended at the War Office, 26 July 1941, LAC, file RG24 C-2 
Vol. 12298.
34  Memorandum by Brigadier Murchie, 6 August 1941, LAC, file RG24 C-2 Vol. 
12298.  
35  Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 6 August 1941, TNA, file DEFE 2/228. 
36  Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 6 August 1941, TNA, file CAB 79/13/0/1.
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doubt have regard to question as to whether prospects of success are 
sufficient to warrant risks involved which include not only personnel but 
possible encouragement to enemy if results negative or worse. We here 
are not in a position to judge of above and other conflicting factors but 
prepared to leave decision to your judgement.37
The British War Cabinet approved Operation Flaxman on the 
morning of 5 August. cmhq in London issued the secret instruction 
“AllIAnce” to Canadian soldiers, and, the following morning, troops 
began to move out of their camps at the town of Oxted, south of 
London, to board trains which would take them to Glasgow, from 
where they were to be shipped to Spitzbergen.38
In summing up the purpose of Operation Flaxman, the British 
Chiefs of Staff commented “that we were operating a fleet in Far 
Northern Waters largely for political reasons.” For this fleet “to 
operate to the best advantage,” the cos indicated that “it was 
necessary to defend the refuelling base at Spitzbergen with a small 
garrison.”39 Thus establishing a military objective for the politically-
motivated Flaxman, they concluded that the operation should be 
designed to “secure, against seaborne and airborne raids, a harbour, 
selected by the Naval Commander as a refuelling base” for Arctic 
shipping until October 1941.40
changing course
In the meantime, the cos had sent a naval reconnaissance mission 
to the archipelago.41 Consequently, the Admiralty [hq] received a 
signal on the evening of 5 August which fundamentally changed 
the nature of the Spitzbergen operation. Rear-Admiral Philip Vian, 
the commander of Force “K” then operating in northern waters in 
37  DEFENSOR to CANMILITARY telegram G.S. 203, 31 July 1941, LAC RG25 
A-2 Vol 829.
38  From SEARAIL TWO to Movements Secc, 5 August 1941, LAC, file RG24 C-2 
Vol 12298.
39  Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 4 August 1941, TNA, file WO 106/1995A.
40  Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, Annex “Draft Directive to the Military 
Commander for an Operation in Spitzbergen,” 5 August 1941, TNA, file 
CAB/80/59/0/1.
41  Joint Planning Staff (41) 584, “Spitzbergen,” 23 July 1941, TNA, file CAB 84/33. 
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support of the Soviets, had been part of the initial British naval 
delegation sent to Murmansk in mid-July to discern joint naval 
arrangements with the Soviets and to scout opportunities for basing 
British ships there. His assessment was decidedly negative, noting 
that the naval facilities and air defences at Murmansk left much 
to be desired, and that the port would only be viable if the British 
invested heavily in improving and strengthening it.42 His subsequent 
naval reconnaissance of Spitzbergen in search of alternative naval 
basing options found the situation there even worse. There were 
no Germans on the archipelago, he reported, and “that [while] a 
military occupation of Spitsbergen would no doubt be possible… a 
naval one was not, because the fiords were iced up for most of the 
year.”43 He determined that available harbours in Spitzbergen were 
too large for effective anti-submarine and anti-aircraft defences,44 and 
the lack of port facilities made it “doubtful if even the redoubtable 
American Sea-Bees could have made a base out of those mountainous 
and ice-covered islands.”45 Accordingly, he informed the Admiralty 
that the “object of heartening Russians will not be achieved by 
[a] Naval force based at sea” and recommended that the “project 
should be abandoned.”46 Vian’s superior, Admiral Tovey, concurred 
fully, echoing that the planned “expedition to Spitzbergen should be 
abandoned” on the grounds that “an operational base at Spitzbergen 
for units of [the] Fleet is not necessary and if established will form a 
commitment which will severely hamper any operations.”47
The cos weighed Vian’s recommendation to abort Flaxman 
against the mounting political pressure that Churchill was placing 
42  Woodman, The Arctic Convoys, 11.
43  Vian, Action This Day, 70.
44  The most suitable anchorage was a harbour 5 miles wide at its mouth, much 
too wide for an effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) defence. The alternative 
anchorage suffered from poor anti-aircraft (A.A.) gun firing positions. Soldiers would 
not be able to get from their garrison to their guns fast enough to respond effectively 
to a sudden air attack. Regardless, the harbour was so large that the Bofors guns 
available had insufficient range to protect the anchorage. Chiefs of Staff Committee, 
Spitzbergen Report, 11 August 1941, TNA, file PREM 3/410.
45  Schofield, The Russian Convoys, 23.
46  Naval Cypher from S. O. Force A to C. in C. Home Fleet, 5 August 1941, TNA, 
file PREM 3/410.
47  Naval Cypher from C. in C. Home Fleet to Admiralty, 7 August 1941, TNA, file 
PREM 3/410.
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on them for Arctic operations in support of the Soviet Union.48 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden had told Soviet Ambassador Ivan 
Mikhailovich Maisky on 5 August that, with Soviet approval, the 
British would dispatch a force to occupy Spitzbergen three days later.49 
Reneging on this promise would have been politically difficult.50 
When McNaughton and Potts met with the cos on 6 August to 
review the situation, McNaughton, who argued that Admiral Vian 
“did not appear to have a clear appreciation of the ‘object’ of the 
proposed expedition,”51 requested that Force 111 be sent for training 
at the Combined Training Centre at Inverary, Scotland, until the 
cos rendered their final decision on whether Flaxman would proceed. 
“The troops taking part in the expedition were completely untrained 
in combined operations,” McNaughton explained, “and if they could 
be held at Inverary they could spend their time most usefully in 
practicing beach landings.”52 The committee agreed to McNaughton’s 
request and postponed the sailing of Flaxman. It also ordered Vian 
to return to London and report to them in person before they made 
a final decision as to the fate of the operation.
The 2,000 Canadian troops, “loaded like a bunch of sardines 
into the carriages” of trains then heading north to Glasgow, were 
completely unaware of the developments at the War Office. The 
Canadians had arrived at Oxted’s train station before noon, finding 
specialized kit waiting for them. By 12:30 pm the first train had been 
packed with kit and men and departed the station for Glasgow. As 
Oxted disappeared from view behind them “the general feeling… was 
one of relief that the journey had commenced,” noted the Saskatoon 
Light Infantry war diarist, “and many wondered whether or not we 
should see the village again.”53 Secrecy had been a central element 
in the preparations of Flaxman.54 There was plenty of speculation 
amongst the men as to what was going to happen to them. As far as 
they knew, they were participating in an exercise called “Heather.” 
48  For example see Prime Minister to General Ismay for Chiefs of Staff, 27 July 1941, 
TNA, file CAB 120/657.
49  Mr. Eden to Sir S. Cripps, 5 August 1941, TNA, file FO/954/24B/0/58.
50  Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 7 August 1941, TNA, file CAB 121/442.
51  Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 6 August 1941, TNA, file WO 106/1995A.
52  Ibid.
53  War Diary Saskatoon Light Infantry, Exercise Heather, 27 July 1941, LAC, file 
RG24 C-3 Vol. 17489.
54  Donald F. Bittner, “Descent in the North - The 1941 Canadian raid on 
Spitsbergen,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 11:4 (1982): 30.
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Staff Officer Major A.H. Norrington outlined to the men what they 
were about to do but not where they were going. As the Second 
Canadian Infantry Brigade war diary notes, the soldiers were simply 
told “that we were to do a job of extreme importance, a job that had 
to be done before the enemy could get a chance at it. That this job 
involved a sea voyage was also given out.”55 
Arriving in Glasgow that evening, the Canadian troops 
disembarked from the trains and quietly boarded the large transport 
ship Empress of Canada. That night the Empress departed Glasgow, 
proceeding slowly down the congested Clyde before turning north 
and heading up Loch Fyne. At noon on 8 August, the ship dropped 
anchor offshore the Special Training Centre (stc) at Inverary. Centre 
staff devised an intense training regime for the Canadians, consisting 
of two main elements. The first was infantry training: rough country 
route marches and cross-country manoeuvers.56 The troops were 
subjected to physical exhaustion, exposed to the harsh highland 
elements, and then forced to make tactical decisions. They were 
also taught to read and sketch maps of the terrain, set demolitions, 
and fight in an urban environment.57 The second element of training 
was “boat work” wherein the troops practiced landing operations. 
This realistic and comprehensive training impressed the officers and 
troops, although “the complete lack of air support integrated into the 
combined arms training” reaffirmed what Stacey observed to be “a 
common army complaint of the period.”58
While the cos awaited the arrival of Vian on 9 August, they tasked 
the jps with investigating the economic consequences for Germany 
if Flaxman succeeded in shutting off the flow of Spitzbergen coal 
to occupied Norway. Military planners consulted with the Ministry 
of Economic Warfare, which said it would welcome a stop to the 
supply of Spitzbergen coal to occupied Norway in hopes that this 
would strain the German economy. The ministry also noted that the 
Soviet Union had been importing about 500,000 tons of coal annually 
from Spitzbergen and that the Royal Navy could provide coverage to 
Russian shipping to re-establish this Arctic coal trade. Furthermore, 
55  Special War Diary 2 CDN INF BDE, Spitzbergen Expedition, 6 August 1941, 
LAC, file RG24 C-3 Vol 17489.
56  CMHQ Historical Report No.56, “The Spitzbergen Operation,” 6. 
57  Military Intelligence Service, British Commandos (Washington DC, US War 
Department, 1942), 29, 100.
58  CMHQ Historical Report No.56, “The Spitzbergen Operation,” 6.
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because “the Germans are very unlikely to get any coal from 
Spitzbergen,” the jps concluded that “there is no object in destroying 
the facilities of the mines in order to deny the coal to the enemy.” It 
advocated for a British policy that would encourage Russian mines 
to supply coal to northern Russia to the fullest extent possible. If the 
Soviets lost their northern flank, the jps recommended the complete 
destruction of all mining facilities and equipment in Spitzbergen, 
as well as the withdrawal of all miners. The Ministry of Labour 
would happily employ the Norwegian miners in the uk, but given the 
unique arrangement that provided for Norwegian sovereignty over 
the archipelago, the Norwegian government-in-exile was unlikely to 
welcome a proposal that would remove their people from Spitzbergen 
while leaving the Russians in place.59
Vian arrived in London on 9 August and immediately reported to 
the cos. His Force “K,” consisting of two cruisers and two destroyers, 
had visited Spitzbergen on 31 July.60 hms Nigeria visited the main 
Norwegian settlement at Longyearby, where the admiral met the 
civilian governor of Spitzbergen. Meanwhile, Captain William 
Agnew in the cruiser Aurora visited the main Soviet settlement 
of Barentsburg, where he was welcomed by Russian Consul F. I. 
Wolnuhi. While the community continued to mine, Agnew learned, 
the Russians expected a German occupation at any moment.61 Before 
the British departed the next day, they seized a Norwegian collier,62 
recruited seventy Norwegian miners to serve in the Free Norwegian 
Army,63 and installed Royal Norwegian Navy Løjtnant R. A. Tamber 
as Military Governor of Spitzbergen. Tamber’s objectives were to 
make sure that local residents did not pass any information about 
the British visit to the Germans and to ferret out any clandestine 
German influence on the islands.64 In his report, Vian reiterated that 
the proposed anchorages at Spitzbergen were not defendable and that 
59  Joint Planning Staff Aide Memoire, Spitzbergen, 8 August 1941, TNA, file 
CAB/79/13/0/1.
60  Mathisen, Svalbard in the Changing Arctic, 34.
61  Vian, Action This Day, 68-69.
62  The collier Dagney was crewed by twenty Norwegian volunteers and was sunk a 
week later by German aircraft while on passage to Scapa Flow. J. G. Elbo, “The War 
in Svalbard, 1939-45,” Polar Record 6:44 (1952): 485.
63  Vian, Action This Day, 68-69.
64  Mathisen, Svalbard in the Changing Arctic, 35.
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he saw “no military advantage in establishing a garrison” in the 
archipelago.65 
The cos Committee’s discussions turned to what to do in light 
of what they had learned. The economic advantages to stopping 
the flow of Spitzbergen coal to Norway remained. “Germany’s war 
effort would mainly be affected by the loss of the bunker coal which 
would have to be made good out of the surplus production from 
Eastern Germany via the Baltic,” a Ministry of Economic Warfare 
representative explained to the Chiefs. “This would throw a further 
strain on German transport. From this point of view, the Ministry 
of Economic Warfare would like to see the mines put out of action, if 
there was no other way of denying our enemies the advantages derived 
from this coal.” Furthermore, the Norwegian miners on Spitzbergen 
had six months of supplies left, while the Soviets only had five 
weeks’ worth (with no prospect of resupply because the Soviets were 
unwilling to send ships to the archipelago). In this context, the cos 
decided that the Allies would benefit if the miners were evacuated 
from Spitzbergen.66
Having reconsidered Flaxman, the cos tasked the jps to revise 
the operation to accomplish the following:
a) evacuate the Soviet miners to the Soviet Union;
b) bring the Norwegian miners to the uk to mine coal;
c) destroy the coal mining facilities in Spitzbergen;
d) destroy the wireless and meteorological stations which supplied 
Germany with weather data.67
“The essence of the operation is speed”68 to minimize the chance of 
German interference, the jps concluded. The jps called for a much 
smaller force of about 400 men, built around a company of Canadian 
infantry from the Edmonton Regiment and a company of Royal 
65  Chiefs of Staff Committee, Spitzbergen Draft Report, 9 August 1941, TNA, file 
CAB/80/59/0/1.
66  Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, Spitzbergen Draft Report, 9 August 1941, 
TNA, file CAB/80/59/0/1. See also Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 6 August 
1941, TNA, file WO 106/1995A. On the political fallout of the handling of the 
operation with Norway, see Mr. Eden to Mr. Collier, 6 August 1941, TNA, file 
FO/954/23B/0/105 and Mann, British Policy and Strategy towards Norway, 45–47.
67  Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 9 August 1941, TNA, file CAN/79/13/0/1.
68  Joint Planning Committee Meeting, Operation “GAUNTLET”, 11 August 1941, 
TNA, CAB 84/34.
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Canadian Engineers. The artillery and supporting occupational 
troops were cut, and a small detachment of Kent Corp Troops, Royal 
Engineers (specially trained for commando demolitions of machinery 
and port installations) added in their place. Designated “Force 111,” 
these troops could still defend themselves against a German air 
attack during their short stay at Spitzbergen using slit trenches and 
dispersion. A single ship, the Empress of Canada (already allotted 
to Flaxman), could transport the whole force. While this vessel 
returned the Russian miners to the Soviet Union, Force 111 could 
carry out the demolitions of the mines on Spitzbergen. If the enemy 
managed to sink the Empress, the Canadians and the Norwegians 
could be embarked on the escorting British cruisers and destroyers 
and returned to England from Spitzbergen. Brigadier Potts would 
be in charge of land operations while overall command of the revised 
Flaxman, now called Operation Gauntlet, would fall to Rear-Admiral 
Vian.69
Given that the operation had direct implications for Norwegian 
and Russian nationals, the British plan needed the consent of its 
Allies. Vian personally explained the situation to King Haakon VII of 
Norway, who was living in exile in Britain, and to Ambassador Maisky. 
The king, concerned for his people on Spitzbergen, supported the new 
evacuation plan as long as damage to Norwegian mining facilities was 
minimal. Maisky, however, thought little of the plan because it did 
not involve the killing of Germans. “I undertook to do my best,” Vian 
promised, “to include this in the programme.”70 Nonetheless, when 
Maisky met with Eden on 11 August, he insisted that occupying 
Spitzbergen was pivotal to the Soviet aim of safeguarding the Allies’ 
northern supply route to the Soviet Union. Rather than withdrawing 
Soviet miners from the archipelago, Maisky reiterated his preference 
of arming them and leaving them in place for the winter. A frustrated 
Eden convinced Maisky and his naval advisor to meet with the cos 
and the Norwegians to discuss the new evacuation plan.71 At that 
meeting, the Norwegian prime minister stated that his government 
fully realized the importance of denying the coal to the Germans, 
as well as the dangers to the miners if the Germans bombed them. 
Accordingly, he agreed to the destruction of the coal mines but wanted 
69  Ibid.
70  Vian, Action This Day, 70.
71  Mr. Eden to Sir S. Cripps, 11 August 1941, TNA, file FO/954/24B/0/61.
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his people evacuated. Turning to the Soviets, the Chiefs explained 
why occupying Spitzbergen would subject its civil population to an 
unacceptably high risk of bombardment, with the highly flammable 
wooden buildings portending a high rate of civilian casualties from 
exposure. Following this logic, Maisky agreed to recommend the 
evacuation of the Soviet miners to his government.72
The Canadians at Inverary ceased their training late in the 
afternoon on 13 August. Boarding the Empress that evening, they 
arrived back in Glasgow the following day where the Patricias and 
the bulk of the Eddies departed, their trains returning them to their 
camps at Oxted. The Empress was unloaded and then reloaded 
with kit and supplies specific to Gauntlet. A Norwegian contingent 
of soldiers boarded the ship, along with a Soviet embassy official, 
who carried a letter from his government to the Soviet consul in 
Spitzbergen.73 By the morning of 18 August, the men of Force 111 
onboard the Empress sailed, with a naval escort, for a still undisclosed 
destination—although the involvement of the Norwegians hinted to 
where they were going.74 Buoyed with enthusiasm at the prospect of 
seeing action, the Canadians conducted boat drills as the Empress 
sailed north between the inner and outer Hebrides. Shortly afterwards 
the aircraft carrier hms Argus and her destroyers dropped behind 
the stern of the Empress, replaced as escorts by the cruisers and 
destroyers of Vian’s Force K.75
operation gauntlet
On the morning of 21 August, the Empress of Canada’s anchor hit 
the water off Hyalfjord, Iceland. There to refuel along with Force K, 
the Empress found herself surrounded by a large number of American 
naval ships, most prominently the battleship uss New Mexico. The 
72  Betraying an insecurity regarding the sovereign status of Spitzbergen, the 
Norwegian prime minister stated his preference that if the Soviets decide not to 
evacuate, that no arms should be shipped to their miners. If the Soviets insist on 
staying, he would like to reconsider his decision to evacuate the Norwegian miners. 
Chiefs of Staff Committee, Annex, 12 August 1941, TNA, file CAB 121/442.
73  War Office for Foreign Office, Operation “GAUNTLET”, 17 August 1941, TNA, 
file WO 106/1998.
74  Bittner, “Descent in the North,” 29. 
75  War Diary “X” Canadian Field Cash, R.C.A.P.C. Force 111, 18 August 1941, 
LAC, file RG24 C-3 Vol. 17489. 
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Canadian officers aboard the Empress soon found themselves playing 
hosts to visitors from the dry American ships who were eager to 
avail themselves of the ship’s stores of alcohol.76 As the festivities 
commenced, Brigadier Potts departed the Empress for the Nigeria to 
meet with Vian and work out the details of the operation order for 
Gauntlet.77 By midnight, the general plan had been drawn up, the 
Americans returned to their ships after various rounds of toasts, and 
Force K and the Empress were once again underway.78
With Iceland well behind the force, Potts held conferences revealing 
to his officers and men that they were heading to Spitzbergen. Due 
to strict operational secrecy, “only a very few senior officers of the 
force had the slightest inkling of the real plan.”79 The men cheered 
when told that they were mounting a raid on Spitzbergen, but were 
disappointed to learn that they were not expected to engage any 
German forces. As the officers of Force 111 stayed up into the night 
working out the details of the plan for their respective units, the 
soldiers manning the anti-aircraft guns on the upper decks of the 
Empress donned the leather jerkins and heavy sheepskin coats that 
had been specially provided for the mission. “The men were saying it 
was the first time their feet had been cold in August,” the Saskatoon 
Light Infantry’s war diary recorded. “This expedition is proceeding 
further north than any military expedition in history.”80 
Force K arrived in the Isfjord of West Spitzbergen, the main 
waterway along which the Norwegian and Soviet settlements were 
situated, early on 25 August. The previous night, Force K had 
rendezvoused with a ragtag convoy of fishing trawlers and an oiler 
sent to support Gauntlet.81 These ships and the rest of Force K 
followed a scouting party of Walrus aircraft that had launched from 
76  Ibid. 
77  Stacey, “The Canadians at Spitsbergen,” 60.
78  Chris Mann and Christer Jorgensen, Hitler’s Arctic War: The German Campaigns 
in Norway, Finland, and the USSR 1940-1945 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2003), 
118; Mann, British Policy and Strategy towards Norway, 12; Henrik O. Lunde, Hitler’s 
Pre-Emptive War : The Battle for Norway, 1940 (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2009), 
551.  For the most comprehensive look at Iceland during the war, see Donald Bittner, 
“The British Occupation of Iceland, 1940-1942” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Missouri, 1974).
79  Stacey, “The Canadians at Spitsbergen,” 53.
80  War Diary Saskatoon Light Infantry, Exercise Heather, 23 August 1941, LAC, file 
RG24 C-3 Vol. 17489.
81  Diary of Ross Munro, 24 August 1941, LAC, file RG24 C-3 Vol 12298.
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the cruisers up the Isfjord, with the Empress dropping anchor offshore 
the main Soviet settlement of Barentsburg.  The soldiers emerging 
on deck found themselves confronted with a sense of “immobility 
and silence.”82 As the Canadians took in their first impressions of 
Spitzbergen, the destroyers, trawlers, and motorboats accompanying 
the Empress came alongside her, picking up detachments of soldiers 
to be ferried to the other settlements that were scattered along the 
western coast of the island.
The Canadians landed first at Barentsburg, the major Soviet 
settlement at Spitzbergen.83 The town was home to just over 
1,200 men, women and children,84 built around “three dreary but 
surprisingly well-built barracks,”85 with some fifty-five wooden 
buildings in all. The town had an enclosed small gauge electric railway 
for coal transport that led from the coal pile along the shoreline at 
the foot of the town up to the primary mine shaft above the town and 
82  Jean Brilhac, The Road to Liberty: The Story of One Hundred and Eight-Six Men 
Who Escaped (London: Peter Davies, 1945), 201.
83  Stacy, “The Canadians at Spitsbergen,” 60–61.
84  Report on Barentsburg Party by Major Bruce Blake, 4 September 1941, LAC, file 
RG24 C-3 Vol. 17489. 
85  Alexander Glen, Footholds Against a Whirlwind (London: Hutchinson of London, 
1975), 81–82.
Major Bury with Edmonton Regiment, Barentsburg. [Canadian Army Photo]
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Spitsbergen 1941. [Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War Vol. I by 
CP Stacey.]
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off to another mine shaft roughly 4 miles to the north.86 Along the 
beach in front of Barentsburg stood a party of a dozen dour Soviet 
officials, clad in “dark caps and blue padded tunics with black drill 
trousers.”87 Arrayed around them were many of the townspeople of 
Barentsburg, silently regarding their visitors. After a brief exchange 
with the Soviet embassy official P.D. Yerzin and their local hosts, 
Potts and his officers climbed a long set of stairs leading up the steep 
slope to conference in the administration building with the Soviet 
consul.88 There, Yerzin gave the consul a letter from Ambassador 
Maisky directing him to cooperate with the Canadians and evacuate 
Spitzbergen’s Soviet citizens.89 The Canadians left at the boats found 
the townspeople to be friendly and welcoming, quickly helping the 
troops to unload their supplies for the command post they intended 
to establish in the town.90
Meanwhile, other detachments of Force 111 fanned out across 
Spitzbergen. Their first priority was the evacuation of the Soviet 
miners from their settlements of Barentsburg, Grumantby, and 
Pyramiden.91 Similar to Barentsburg, the inhabitants at the other 
Soviet settlements gave Force 111 a friendly greeting upon their 
arrival.92 Allotted only twenty-four hours to evacuate, the Soviets 
were very cooperative, assisting Force 111 in both the unloading of 
Canadian supplies, the loading of their own baggage, and in the 
demolitions of their mining infrastructure.93 In Barentsburg, however, 
the Soviet consul soon interrupted this cooperation. Described by 
an accompanying British official as “an unctuous little man with a 
diverting squint,” Consul Wolnuhi was openly apprehensive about 
repatriation to the Soviet Union and quickly turned to drinking after 
his meeting with Potts and Yezin.94 Fortified with large quantities 
86  Special War Diary 2 CDN INF BDE, Spitzbergen Expedition, 25 August 1941, 
LAC, file RG24 C-3 Vol 17489.
87  Ross Munro, Gauntlet to Overlord: The Story of the Canadian Army (Toronto: 
Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1946), 284.
88  Ibid.
89  Special War Diary 2 CDN INF BDE, Spitzbergen Expedition, 25 August 1941, 
LAC, file RG24 C-3 Vol 17489.
90  Army Film Unit Secret Dope Sheet, 9 September 1941, LAC, file RG24 C-3 Vol 
17489.
91  Stevens, A City Goes to War, 211.
92  Stacey, “The Canadians at Spitsbergen,” 61.
93  Report by Major Bruce Blake in “EMPRESS OF CANADA” on Embarkation of 
Russians at Barentsburg, 28 August 1941, TNA, file WO 106/1942.
94  Glen, Footholds Against a Whirlwind, 82.
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of alcohol by mid-afternoon, he suddenly demanded that the heavy 
machinery and mining equipment of Barentsburg also be loaded 
aboard the Empress, despite having already agreed to restrictions 
imposed by the tight operational schedule and the limited space 
aboard ship.95 In response to his demands, Soviet officials immediately 
ceased cooperating with the Canadians, throwing the tight schedule of 
Gauntlet into jeopardy. Despite the best persuasive efforts of military 
liaison officer Major Blake Bruce, Wolnuhi would not budge.96 His 
demands could not have come at a worst time. Dead in the water 
and loading civilians, the Empress was a sitting duck for a potential 
German air attack.
Potts was quickly summoned to Barentsburg to deal with the 
troublesome consul. Wolnuhi continued to be obstinate, declaring 
that he would only drop his demands if ordered to do so by Vian (the 
overall commander of Gauntlet as indicated in the letter from Maisky). 
While Potts left to signal Vian aboard the Nigeria, Major Bruce’s 
alternative effort to induce Wolnuhi to cooperation came to fruition. 
Bruce had made sure that two additional bottles of champagne and 
a bottle of Madeira made their way into the consul’s hands.  Before 
Potts received a response from Vian, Wolnuhi had degraded into a 
drunken stupor and then fell asleep.97 The consul’s officials carried 
him aboard the Empress and proved more cooperative in helping 
the Canadians finish their evacuation of Soviet citizens. Just after 
midnight, the Empress was underway for Archangel, escorted by 
Vian’s Nigeria and half of Force K’s destroyers.98
Meanwhile the Norwegian communities, expecting a permanent 
occupation, were “astonished and upset” to learn that they were to 
be evacuated.99 After appropriate explanations from the Norwegian 
officials and the soldiers of Force 111, they accepted the requirement 
for evacuation, which proceeded with minimal difficulties. Over the 
next few days the remaining half of Force K visited the various 
Norwegian settlements, depositing detachments from Force 111 to 
95  Bittner, “Descent in the North,” 31.
96  Report by Major Bruce Blake in “EMPRESS OF CANADA” on Embarkation 
of Russians at Barentsburg, 28 August 1941, TNA, file WO 106/1942 and Mann, 
British Policy and Strategy towards Norway, 49.
97  Mann, British Policy and Strategy towards Norway, 49.
98  Bittner, “Descent in the North,” 31, and Stacey, “The Canadians at Spitsbergen,” 
61.
99  Bittner, “Descent in the North,” 30.
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conduct demolitions and collect miners and trappers, whom they 
concentrated at the main Norwegian settlement of Longyearby. The 
Norwegians manning the weather and wireless stations broadcasted 
false reports of heavy and persistent fog to discourage any German 
reconnaissance flights over the archipelago during the operation. The 
deception worked.100
As had been the case with the Soviets, the relations between 
Force 111 and the Norwegian officials proved challenging. Einer 
Sverdrup,101 the director of the mines at Longyearby, argued with 
Potts over the proposed destruction of the mining facilities. Motivated 
to preserve the mines for postwar Norway, Sverdrup sought to remain 
in Spitzbergen with a small caretaker party. Even when the sappers 
repeatedly assured him that the demolitions would be made in such a 
manner as to allow the mines to restart later in a reasonable period 
of time, Sverdrup still refused to leave. When the frustrated mining 
100  Stacey, “The Canadians at Spitsbergen,” 62.
101  Einer was the nephew of arctic explorer Otto Sverdrup who rose to fame while 
captaining the Fram on her voyages to chart what became known as the Sverdrup 
Islands in the Canadian Arctic archipelago from 1898 to 1902. Glen, Footholds 
Against a Whirlwind, 82.
The Norwegians readying for evacuation from Longyearbyen. [Library and Archives Canada 
e011184640]
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director threatened to protest to his government, Potts assured 
Sverdrup that he would have every chance to do so when he arrived 
in Britain in a few days’ time.102 Sverdrup had little recourse but to 
acquiesce, and the demolitions of the Norwegian mines’ audits and 
supporting facilities went ahead as planned.103
After an uneventful voyage, the Empress of Canada and her 
escorts arrived in the White Sea on 29 August where they were met 
by a Soviet destroyer flying the flag of Admiral Dolini. During his 
altercation with the officers of Force 111, Consul Wolnuhi had broken 
radio silence and dispatched a message to his superiors in Leningrad 
alleging that the Canadians had mistreated him and the miners. The 
following day Maisky took up the matter with the Foreign Office, 
recounting the consul’s message.104 Word of this reached Vian aboard 
the Nigeria who simply replied to the Admiralty that the consul’s 
allegations were “quite untrue.”105 What could have grown into a 
diplomatic incident was quickly diffused when Dolini confronted the 
102  Report by Major A.S.T. Godfrey, Operation “GAUNTLET”, 4 September 1941, 
TNA, file WO 32/10090 and Elbo, “The War in Svalbard,” 486.
103  Bittner, “Descent in the North,” 32–33.
104  F.O. Minute, Mr. Strang, 27 August 1941, TNA, file FO 371-29489. 
105  Naval Cypher from S. O. Force “A” to Admiralty, 28 August, TNA, file FO 
371/29489.
Royal Canadian Engineer sappers fire the coal pile at Barentsburg. [Library and Archives Canada 
PA-180524]
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consul, who admitted that the evacuation arrangements and the 
passage to Archangel had been satisfactory.106
That afternoon, 2,000 Soviet miners and over 200 tons of their 
baggage were disembarked at Archangel. The ships spent the night 
offshore only to be met the following morning by a rendition of “La 
Marseillaise.” Some 192 French soldiers emerged out of the fog aboard 
a Soviet barge, haggard in appearance but jubilant at the sight of the 
Empress. Following the Fall of France, these soldiers had been interned 
in German prisoner of war camps. Their repatriation continuously 
pushed off by their captors, they had escaped into the Soviet Union 
only to find themselves in worse conditions. Gauntlet afforded the 
various parties involved in this uncomfortable reality to return these 
soldiers to Britain where they could join the Free French Forces.107
Late on 2 September the two halves of Force K were reunited in 
the waters of the Isfjord to find the town of Barentsburg in flames. 
Much of Force 111 had been billeted there, and the troops had been 
awakened the previous morning to the alarm raised by the sentries. A 
fire had broken out in a covered area of the light railway leading from 
the mouth of the mine to the jetty below the town. The structure 
was wooden and saturated in coal dust. The steady 18-knot wind 
was channeled by the shape of the covered railway, which acted as a 
flue and quickly whipped the fire into a raging inferno. Firefighting 
equipment was limited and a pump fed by seawater to keep the 
flames at bay broke down after a few hours of use. The troops did 
everything they could to stem the blaze but, at times, they could not 
get within 300 feet of the inferno due to the intense heat. Ultimately, 
the fire destroyed the town.108
Despite this setback, the demolitions elsewhere on Spitzbergen 
went off as planned over the next few days. Military engineers 
destroyed the infrastructure supporting the mines while leaving the 
mines themselves largely intact. The various railways and conveyors 
that transferred the coal from the mines to piles along the shoreline 
were blown-up. All of this free coal, approximately 450,000 tons, was 
burned along with 225,000 gallons of oil and gasoline. Another 50,000 
gallons were poured into the sea. Power plants were either disabled 
through the removal of critical components or destroyed outright 
106  Mr. Sargent to Mr. Maisky, 5 September 1941, TNA, file FO 371/29489.
107  For an eye-witness account of their ordeal, see Brilhac, The Road to Liberty.
108  Bittner, “Descent in the North,” 33.
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with explosives. Radio and meteorology equipment was disabled 
and wireless masts felled by charges. Motor boats and lighters, after 
assisting Force 111, were sunk. Summarizing his handiwork, the head 
engineer of Force 111 estimated that it would take six months of work 
to put the mines of Spitzbergen back into production.109
When demolitions were completed, the vessels of Force K collected 
the Canadians who were scattered across Spitzbergen and returned 
them to the Empress to mingle with the 765 Norwegian civilians 
and 192 French soldiers now aboard. Thus on 3 September, with 
operations concluded, the Empress weighed anchor and departed 
with Force K for Scotland. The voyage home was uneventful, aside 
from some receptions thrown by the Free French and Norwegian 
soldiers for the Canadians and crew.110 Vian, however, had received 
new orders: intercept a German troop convoy sailing around Norway 
for the Murmansk front. His two cruisers slipped away once the 
Empress came under the air umbrella protecting British waters, and 
Vian successfully engaged the German vessels just east of the North 
Cape early on 7 September. In rough waters and in poor visibility 
Nigeria and Aurora sunk the German training cruiser kms Bremse. 
Nigeria’s bow was heavily damaged, having rammed and shorn 
Bremse in half during the engagement, but she was able to limp 
home without sustaining any casualties. The troop ships under escort 
of Bremse managed to escape into the foul weather. In the end, Vian 
had kept his promise to Maisky—he had killed Germans.111 
The Empress of Canada berthed back in Glasgow on the 
morning of 9 September, “her deck rails ... lined with uniformed and 
un-uniformed figures curiously surveying all around them, probably 
wondering what their new surroundings and temporary home were 
like, and prospecting on what it held for them in their immediate 
days ahead.”112 The French were taken off the ship first and almost 
immediately entrained for London to join General Charles De Gaulle’s 
109  Major G. Walsh, C.R.E. Report, Force 111, 6 September 1941, LAC, file RG24 
C-3 Vol 17489 and Bittner, “Descent in the North,” 33.
110  Special War Diary 2 CDN INF BDE, Spitzbergen Expedition, 5 and 7 September 
1941, LAC, file RG24 C-3 Vol 17489.
111  Vian, Action This Day, 72. The two troop ships being escorted by Bremse carried 
1500 soldiers bound for Dielt’s army. Woodman, The Arctic Convoys, 1941-1945, 36.
112  Immigration Officer’s Report, Norwegian Refugees & Company from Spitzbergen, 
17 September 1941, TNA, file HO 213/1759.
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nascent Free French Forces.113 By noon the bulk of the Canadians 
began to disembark the Empress, taken by truck to a transit camp 
to await trains that would return them to their barracks in Oxted.114 
The Norwegians were the last to leave. Billeted in a nearby school for 
a few days as British immigration and security forces vetted them, 
most of the Norwegians who did not volunteer for service with the 
Free Norwegian Forces were eventually sent to work the coal mines 
of the remote Orkney Islands.115
The Canadians arrived back at Oxted the following morning, 
dragging themselves off their overnight trains from Scotland to be 
granted a twenty-four hour leave. Looking back on Gauntlet, the 
Saskatoon Light Infantry’s war diarist offered the opinion that “the 
expedition was a wonderful experience,” their only real complaint 
that “they had no Bosche to shoot.” In the meantime, the Canadians 
determined that they would make the most of the short leave granted 
to them as a reward for their hard work at Spitzbergen. After all, while 
Spitzbergen was a small event from the perspective of the overall war, 
“five weeks away from their lady friends seemed a long time to them.”116
taking stock of gauntlet
In summing up Operation Gauntlet, C.P. Stacey concluded that “the 
force employed was small and its object limited; this was, in fact, a 
minor operation whose importance could easily be exaggerated.”117 
Nevertheless, the small force and limited objectives reflected the 
complexities of coalition warfare. The evacuation of 2,000 Russian and 
765 Norwegians from unoccupied Spitzbergen and the demolition of 
the supporting mining infrastructure in the archipelago followed ten 
weeks of diplomatic negotiations between Britain, the Soviet Union, 
113  Immigration Officer’s Report, Volunteers for the Allied Forces, 28 September 
1941, TNA, file HO 213/1759. 
114  Special War Diary 2 CDN INF BDE, Spitzbergen Expedition, 10 September 
1941, LAC, file RG24 C-3 Vol 17489.
115  Immigration Officer’s Report, Norwegian Refugees & Company from Spitzbergen, 
17 September 1941, TNA, file HO 213/1759 and Orkney Constabulary to the Under 
Secretary of State, Home Office, Aliens Department, 10 November 1941, TNA, file 
HO 213/1759.
116  War Diary Saskatoon Light Infantry, Exercise Heather, 9 September 1941, LAC, 
file RG24 C-3 Vol. 17489.
117  Stacey, Six Years of War, 306. 
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Norway, and Canada. During this process two operational plans were 
drawn up, with Flaxman rescaled into Gauntlet as the Chiefs of 
Staff sought a military rationale to justify a politically-motivated 
operation. This smaller evacuation scheme disappointed the Soviet 
Union, satisfied a reluctant Britain, and Norway acquiesced. As 
Gauntlet unfolded, the Canadians experienced difficulties with local 
Soviet and Norwegian officials that threw important aspects of 
the operation into jeopardy and touched off two minor diplomatic 
incidents.118 Conversely, Gauntlet allowed for the quiet transfer 
of Soviet-held French soldiers to Free French Forces, removing a 
diplomatic impediment that illustrates the awkward political 
baggage that had to be overcome between the newfound allies.
Ultimately, Operation Gauntlet was a “diplomatic raid”119 
motivated by political pressure for early British military action 
to support their new and hard-pressed Russian allies. From this 
strategic perspective, the operation had little impact. Enthusiastic 
British and Canadian media coverage following Gauntlet’s conclusion 
greatly exaggerated its significance, exacerbating Russian disappoint 
with Britain’s meagre efforts to support them militarily. Sir Stafford 
Cripps, the British ambassador in Moscow, reported to the Foreign 
Office on 9 September 1941:
The account of the Spitzbergen operation by the B.B.C. today… was 
disastrous as far as this country is concerned. It was apparently an 
attempt to make out that this operation was a dangerous and important 
one… In view of their recent pressure on us to do something big in the 
West, this will be taken as an elaborate and stupid attempt to magnify 
a simple and safe operation into something large and important and will 
either be resented or laughed at.120
118  While the Russian consul’s allegations of mistreatment at the hands of the 
Canadians were resolved with Russian officials as recounted, Einer Sverdrup’s 
protest of excessive destruction of his mines by the Canadians were taken up by 
his government after the completion of Gauntlet, leading to a Norwegian request 
for compensation. See Laurence Collier reporting RE: Norwegian Complaint about 
Canadians, 6 March 1942, TNA, FO 371/32928. Sverdrup was able to use this 
pressure to help secure British naval support for an ill-fated Norwegian caretaker 
party led by himself that returned to Spitzbergen the following summer. See Glen, 
Footholds Against the Whirlwind, 94-95, 102-06.
119  Coutu, “Le quartier général des opérations combinées et l’expédition canado-
britannique au Spitzberg,” 48.
120  Sir S. Cripps to Foreign Office, 9 September 1941, TNA, file WO 106/2001.
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Britain’s No. 30 Military Mission in Moscow elaborated on this in a 
report to the War Office, calling the results of the overblown news 
coverage “psychologically tragic” for the Russians. Pointing out that 
these new allies were “continually begging us to do something on 
a scale sufficient to relieve the pressure on them,” he noted “that 
so fulsome a description of this landing operation on an island full 
of Russians will strike a very false note here.” 121 From a Russian 
perspective, Operation Gauntlet—like the other minor operations 
undertaken along the Norwegian and French coasts—was no 
substitute for the demanded second front.122
The original Soviet geostrategic premise motivating Operation 
Gauntlet was that Spitzbergen could be used as a base to protect the 
vital sea lane from Britain to Russia. When this premise was scuttled 
after Vian’s reconnaissance of Spitzbergen, the cos settled upon an 
economic warfare rationale: depriving Germany of a source of coal 
while securing Soviet and Norwegian miners to support the Allied war 
effort.123 An additional benefit of Gauntlet, underappreciated by its 
planners, saw the raid temporarily disrupt the flow of valuable weather 
data to Germany with which they planned their military campaigns.124 
121  No.30 Military Mission Moscow to War Office, 9 September 1941, TNA, file WO 
106/2001.
122  Christopher Mann notes that this argument for coastal raids as a surrogate 
second front was taken to its logical conclusion with the tragic Dieppe Raid. Mann, 
British Policy and Strategy towards Norway, 50, 92–93. 
123  Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 9 August 1941, TNA, file CAN/79/13/0/1.
124  William Dege, War North of 80: The Last German Arctic Weather Station of 
World War II (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2004); and Franz Selinger 
and Alexander Glen, “Arctic Meteorological Operations and Counter-Operations 
During World War II,” Polar Record 21:135 (1983): 563. As the weather that affects 
much of Europe comes from its north and west, Spitzbergen’s weather reports 
played an important role in Germany’s compilation of continental weather forecasts. 
Throughout the war, Germany used these forecasts to shape many of their military 
campaigns, from postponing their invasion of France to the planning of bombing 
raids against Britain. This weather data was even used to set the date for their 
invasion of the Soviet Union. See Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms: A 
Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
122, 204, 764; Dege, War North of 80; Selinger and Glen, “Arctic Meteorological 
Operations,” 563; and MIS, British Commandos, 114. Germany established manned 
and automated weather stations across the Arctic and on Spitzbergen soon after 
Gauntlet which operated until the end of the Second World War. On these stations, 
see Dege, War North of 80. Given the size, isolation and ruggedness of Spitzbergen 
it would have been impossible for the Allies to have prevented the establishment of 
these stations with even a large garrison of the archipelago. See Selinger and Glen, 
“Arctic Meteorological Operations,” 564.
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To these benefits must be added the counter-factual argument made 
by the jps that the evacuation of Spitzbergen’s miners prevented a 
humanitarian crisis from developing: either in the form of the Soviet 
miners running out of supplies as Spitzbergen slipped into the frozen 
and lingering darkness of an Arctic winter, or of German incendiary 
bombing of these miners, leading to mass exposure.125 Had either 
scenario come to pass, the British would have been hard pressed to 
respond.
Despite Gauntlet proving superfluous to the protection of the 
sea lane from Britain to Russia, the operation demonstrated “the 
advantages of sea power and the options available to the nation which 
possesses it” to quote Bittner’s assessment.126 Given British control of 
the sea, they were able to dispatch the force with appropriate naval 
assets to mitigate the risks if the Germans opposed the landing and to 
ensure that the soldiers arrived safely. A report on British commando 
operations produced by the us military intelligence branch in August 
1942, observed:
During the most dangerous part of the voyage the troop transport 
was safeguarded by an aircraft carrier and land-based aircraft patrols, 
as well as by the three destroyers, so that it could have maximum 
protection against air attack. When distance had reduced the danger 
from German bombers, the aircraft carrier left the expedition and two 
cruisers joined the destroyer escort as replacements. The cruisers and 
the destroyers were the best type of vessels to deal with a possible 
opposed landing and to safeguard the transport in evacuating the 
Russians to Archangel.127
Equally important, the Royal Navy had the capacity to actually 
carry the Russian miners and their families to Russia and also to 
move the Norwegians at Spitzbergen to the United Kingdom. These 
nationals, in turn, could then support the Allied war effort.  
From a Canadian perspective, Gauntlet was a tactical success 
that boosted the moral of the participating troops. The limited 
objectives of evacuating the miners, destroying the coal mining 
125  Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, Spitzbergen Draft Report, 9 August 1941, 
TNA, file CAB/80/59/0/1.
126  Bittner, “Descent in the North,” 33.
127  MIS, British Commandos, 116.
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facilities, and demolishing the wireless and meteorological stations on 
Spitzbergen were all met efficiently and effectively.128 The Canadians 
maintained the utmost operational secrecy from the conception of 
Gauntlet to its execution, preventing the Germans from finding out 
about and interfering with the operation.129 Furthermore, the ongoing 
transmission of deceptive weather reports from Spitzbergen by local 
Norwegian operators during the Allied evacuation concealed from the 
enemy that anything unusual was taking place on the islands and 
thus discouraged German aerial reconnaissance.130
The composition of Force 111 showed the effectiveness of 
integrating a balanced group of individuals with appropriate skills 
and expertise to handle all phases of the mission. Infantry formed 
the largest element of the force, which reflected the possibility of an 
opposed landing and the need for a critical mass of soldiers to oversee 
the evacuation efforts.  Engineers, who were charged with carrying out 
the main object of the task-demolitions, formed the next largest group, 
led by a highly qualified mining engineer. An appropriate number of 
signal troops also succeeded in seizing, operating deceptively, and 
ultimately destroying the radio stations on Spitzbergen in cooperation 
with local civilians. Furthermore, the inclusion of a small detachment 
of twenty-five Free Norwegian troops also proved beneficial to this 
alliance operation, lending “greater validity to the mission in the 
eyes of the Norwegian residents, who had to stand by and see their 
property destroyed at a time when it was not under control of the 
enemy nor facing direct threat of attack.”131 In turn, this helped 
to ensure favourable civilian perceptions of the military force and 
indicated its determination to act in the civil interest.
Gauntlet’s tactical success can also be attributed to the unity of 
its command. The British Chiefs of Staff assigned supreme command 
of the expedition while at sea to the naval commander because of 
the vulnerability of the naval units to air attack. “This assignment 
of authority placed the greatest responsibility for the safety of the 
expedition and its ships on the individual—the naval commander—
who alone controlled the means of evacuating the comparatively small 
128  Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 9 August 1941, TNA, file CAN/79/13/0/1.
129  Capelotti, The Svalbard Archipelago, 59–60; Stacey, “The Canadians at 
Spitsbergen,” 71.
130  MIS, British Commandos, 116.
131  Ibid., 115.
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force of soldiers,” a wartime report noted.132 Nevertheless, Brigadier 
Potts was given command of all operations ashore. “In selecting 
Brigadier Potts for the command of this detachment of the Canadian 
Corps,” General A.G.L. McNaughton wrote, “both General Pearkes 
and I had every confidence that he would discharge his responsibilities 
to the satisfaction of all concerned and I am very happy that this has 
been so.”133 
The main challenge facing the Canadians came in managing 
the civilian dimension of the operation at Spitzbergen. Brigadier 
Potts showed flexibility in his approach, recognizing the need 
to carry out assessments of the local civilian environment and to 
adapt plans (where possible) to meet local needs. In dealing with 
the Russian consul, Potts used his command authority and skills of 
persuasion—aided by clever tactics such as plying the Russian consul 
with alcohol—to secure cooperation from civil authorities. Similarly, 
although the original plans provided for a small maintenance party 
132  Ibid., 115.
133  11 September 1941, A.G.L. McNaughton to General Sir John Dill, Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, LAC, RG 24, vol. 12298, file “3 CDN CORPS-3 SPECIAL 
EXPEDITION No.111.”
Brigadier A.E. Potts takes the salute during the final parade in Longyearbyen. [Library and 
Archives Canada e011184643]
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of Norwegians to remain on Spitzbergen, during Pott’s disagreement 
with the Norwegian mining official, a spokesperson for the resident 
community requested on behalf of the Norwegian inhabitants that 
everyone be evacuated to Britain. Fear of reprisals against anyone 
who remained, or against their families back in Norway, justified this 
argument. Potts considered this request in an impartial manner and, 
after consulting with Vian, agreed.134 This display of pragmatism 
and sensitivity helped to make the mission successful. Although 
questions would later arise about whether the conduct of the 
mission met legal and moral obligations to the local population, the 
accusations launched at the Canadian soldiers for discourteousness, 
misbehaviour, or malfeasance in the burning of Barentsburg proved 
unfounded.  Instead, the interactions between the military force and 
the allied populations on Spitzbergen proved overwhelmingly friendly 
and cooperative.
Operation Gauntlet brought additional benefits for the Canadian 
forces serving in Britain. Stacey observed that this “adventurous 
enterprise” had a “useful effect upon morale,” providing expectations of 
future employment against the enemy.135 Furthermore, McNaughton’s 
biographer John Swettenham explained that “the successful outcome 
of this minor operation” meant that the Canadian corps commander’s 
“powers were widened: he was now permitted to take immediate action 
to commit his troops to raids or similar operations.”136 None of these 
operations would take the Canadians back to the European Arctic, 
however. Instead, subsequent wartime developments would encourage 
134  Notes on subsequent Meeting held at Longyearby, 31 August 1941, TNA, file 
WO/32/10090.
135  Stacey, CMHQ Historical Report No.56, “The Spitzbergen Operation,” para. 112.
136  Swettenham, McNaughton, 182. The War Committee of Cabinet discussed the 
new powers that McNaughton was granted specifically for the Spitzbergen operation 
and agreed to generalize this authority to cover future, similar projects of a temporary 
nature. “While suggesting McNaughton should use his own judgement whether to set 
in such cases,” the committed noted, “he would notify Minister of National Defence 
in general terms prior to event where practicable.” Secretary of State for External 
Affairs to Canadian High Commission, 10 November 1941, LAC, file RG25 A-2 Vol. 
829. In April 1942, a small party of Canadians participated in a British raid on the 
French coast near Boulogne but, failing to get ashore, they took no active part in 
engaging the Germans.
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Canadian decision makers to re-conceptualize their country’s own 
northern expanses as a potential theatre of operation.137
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
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appendix a: composition of force 111138
Unit Officers Enlisted 
Men
Canadian
Headquarters, 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade 5 12
Signals Section, 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade 2 32
3 Field Company, Royal Canadian Engineers 5 191
D Company, plus one platoon C Company, 
Edmonton Regiment
6 153
Saskatoon Light Infantry (Machine Gun) 
(Composite detachment)
4 80
Detachment, Royal Canadian Army Medical 
Corps (from 5 Canadian Field Ambulance)
3 23
“X” Canadian Field Cash Office, Royal Canadian 
Army Pay Corps
1 2
Empress of Canada Ship’s Staff (from Edmonton 
Regiment)
2 5
Total Canadian 29 498
British
Detachment, Kent Corps Troops, Royal Engineers 4 31
Detachment, 992 Docks Operations Company, 
Royal Engineers
1 18
Detachment, “B” Section 1 Motor Boat Company, 
Royal Army Service Corps
1 19
Detachment, 60 Detail Issue Depot, Royal Army 
Service Corps
- 6
“D” Field Cash Office, Royal Army Pay Corps 1 2
Royal Engineers (Movement Control), Attached 
2 Canadian Brigade Headquarters
- 3
Intelligence Corps 3 -
Army Film Unit 1 -
Major H.C. Smith, Liaison Officer** 1 -
Captain E.W. Proctor, Royal Engineers 1 1
138  See GAUNTLET-FLAXMAN, Appendix VI - Order of Battle, 22 December 
1943, TNA, file DEFE 2/228.
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Unit Officers Enlisted 
Men
Major A.W. Salmon, Royal Army Service Corps 1 -
Total British 14 79
Norwegian
Detachment, Norwegian Infantry 3 22
TOTAL 46 599
*This figure includes civilian journalist Ross Munro (Canadian Press).
** Canadian serving with British forces.
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